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5 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN DRY REGIONS
Dick Foeken & Ton Dietz
5.1 The Contents of government Intervention in dry regions: a general
introduction
In many development-oriented socio-economic studies the emphasis is on a
'developmentalist' interpretation of government activity. But governments are
not only and not mainly concerned with 'development'. And behind the
'development-inspired' activities a large variety of intentions can be discovered.
Studying the intentions behind government policies in dry areas throughout the
world, a student research group from the Department of Human Geography
differentiated eight major types of approaches (ISG, 1984):
1 Neglect: although a government formally claims the responsibility for a
particular area, there is no active government presence and no
government activity.
2 Repression: the government is only interested in pacification, in
maintaining (its) law and order. Military and police activities dommate the
government presence. Strategie roads are being built, often using forced
labor.
3 Expropriation: the government is mainly concerned with acquisition of tax
money and/or forced delivery of local produce.
4 Labor migrant supply: urged by labor-demanding companies (settlers,
mining companies) or foreign exchange needs (in the case of long-
distance labor migration), the government stimulates labor migration, by
taxation, direct recruitment, training for non-local Jobs, sometimes by the
establishment of banking facilities for labor migrant remittances.
5 Changing the conditions for production and distribution: the government is
trying to create better conditions for growth or development, without being
involved in production and distribution itself. There are vanous
possibilities: . .
 ±.
to create better material conditions for production and marketing,
for instance by roads, electricity and water facilities, irrigation
works, credit facilities;
to improve the 'human resources', by expandmg production-
oriented education and training facilities;
to change relations of production, for instance by land reform or
land ownership regulations, by labor laws;
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to change the distribution of the population, for instance by
resettlement schemes.
6 Changing the organization of production and distribution: introducing more
productive means of production, a more efficiënt organization of
production and distribution, a better marketing system. Often this will
mean the introduction of types of production which did not exist yet in the
area (irrigation, water harvesting, fertilizers, new seeds, new breeds,
mining, industrial activities).
7 Improving the consumption/welfare Situation for the population as a whole
or for particular groups. The government supplies food for work or
employment projects, gives subsidies on consumer goods and on services
in the sphere of general education, health care, drinking water, housmg.
Three subgroups can be differentiated:
emergency assistance after calamities like droughts, to avoid
starvation and to repair damage being done (many disaster
rescue and famine relief operations);
a basic needs strategy: guaranteeing a minimum level of food,
housing conditions and services;
a 'western' welfare strategy: guaranteeing a minimum level of
income (minimum wage regulations, unemployment benefits,
pensions, basic income) and access to a number of basic public
services (not necessarily free of charge).
8 Protecting the environment: the government protects wildlife, and forests
against human exploitation; land use is regulated to prevent soil erosion,
soil quality reduction, water pollution.
5.2 The institutional form of government Intervention in dry regions
One of the main themes of this study concerns the ways in which governments
intervene in dry regions. Are there differences between the five countnes and
the five fieldwork areas in this respect? And if so, to what extent can these
regional contrasts be attributed to a) the contents of interventions and b) the
form of government presence and interference?
Although these two aspects often are closely related, with government
interventions and their results being influenced by the degree of government
presence, there is an important difference between the two. Government
presence is a structural phenomenon and in this study refers to the territorial
organization of the various parts of a country's government and administration.
Institutional interventions, by contrast, are elements of policy making and the
Implementation thereof. Here we touch upon Grindle's distinction between what
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he calls 'context' variables and 'content' variables. The context must be seen äs
the political and administrative environment in which policy implementation
takes place. Of equal importance for the implementation process, and thus for
the actual results of public policy, is the content of the specific policy (Grindle,
1980, p. 5). With implementation is meant "an ongoing process of decision-
making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by
the content of the program being pursued and by the interaction of the
decision-makers within a given politico-administrative context" (Ibid, pp. 5-6).
The first context variable is related to the means of Intervention. What means
does a central government have to intervene, to impose its strategy or policy?
What means do local administrators have to effectuate the stated policy goals?
Above all, they need material means (money), for which they are more or less
dependent on the higher echelons in the bureaucratie hierarchy. The budget
which local administrators have at their disposal is, among others, dependent
on: (1) how the national budget is spread over the various ministries; (2) how
each ministerial budget is divided among the various departments within the
organization, (3) which departments are active at the local level and implement
what program(s), (4) what local means the local administrator can collect and
use. In general, the lower the position of the administrator in the periphery, the
smaller his budget is likely to be. However, the success of any implementation
process at the local level is not only dependent on material means, but also on
immaterial means. Grindle (1980, p. 12) uses the term "compliance" to denote
the support from groups having interests in the policy program. Of course, the
local administrators responsible for the implementation of the program have to
comply with the policy. If they do, they have to assure themselves of the
support of local interest groups or elites. If there are conflicts of interest
between local government and other local elites, implementation may easily fail.
In such cases, the bargaining power of the administrator will, once again,
depend on his material means. Even if there is no conflict of interest,
implementation can only succeed if both elites support the policy program.
An important second context variable concerns the decision-making room for
local administrators and interest groups. To what extent can they manipulate
the implementation process? This depends on the bureaucratie and geographic
distance separating local administrators from the central government, and on
the measure of contra! which the central government has over these local
areas. Various authors stress that the political center can - and does - impose
its will on the periphery, even though this is sometimes considered to be a
vertical, i.e., bureaucratie, process (e.g., Schaffer & Huang, 1975), sometimes a
horizontal, i.e., geographic, process (e.g., Tarrow, 1977), and sometimes both a
bureaucratie and geographic process (e.g., Coleman, 1977; Heeger, 1974).
According to Heeger and Tarrow, there often is some reciprocity in the
relationships between central and local elites. Heeger (1974, p. 60) stresses
personal relations between patrons and clients (clientelism) within ethnic
58
groups, within and between families, etc. The central elites can use such
relationships to send goods and services to the periphery in exchange for
status and, if necessary, for electoral support. Tarrow (1977, p. 29), however,
points out that this reciprocity becomes less relevant with increasing physical
and bureaucratie distance between the center and the periphery. In that case,
communication between the two is more difficult, which brings him to
hypothesize that the more peripheral the periphery is, the greater is the
decision-making power at the local level.
The third and last type of context variable which is important concerns the
relationship between the local population (often the target group in public
policies directed toward dry regions) and local administrators. In theory this
relationship should be a reciprocal one: local administrators must be responsive
to the wishes and needs of the population and the population must have
access to the local administration. Otherwise, implementation of the programs
is likely to be troublesome or may fall altogether. Harvey et al. (1979, p. 61)
conclude that the distribution of values by government institutions is biased
against the "small" ("the poorer, the more distant, etc."), and that it is the nature
of bureaucratie access arrangements (access rules, exclusions, costs, etc.) to
create that bias. For that reason, the results of the implementation process are
always unexpected and unmeant: "implementation results in failures, a
regressive exacerbation of existing inequalities and dualities, an exploitation of
access opportunities for the more favored, possibilities of corruption and in
some cases an increase in dependency" (Ibid, p. 61).
In the case study chapters various aspects of the context of government
Intervention will be discussed. To understand the contents of government policy
in these particular case study areas, it is useful first to look at the general
characteristics of the contents of the government interventions at a scale of the
dry regions in each of the five countries together.
5.3 Government policy in Togo's dry areas
In Togo, except for a very narrow stretch of land directly on the southern coast,
the savannah region in the North is the only semiarid/subhumid area. Attention
in this paragraph is therefore almost exclusively directed to this region.
German colonization of Togo from 1895 until 1914 did not aim to develop the
natural resources of the northern part. lts agricultural potential was not
favorable enough to grow profitable crops like coffee and cocoa. Moreover the
distance to the coast was long and roads poorly developed. Thus, commercial
production of other crops would not be profitable either. However, the region
was attractive to the Germans because it was a transit-area for African long-
distance trade. The Germans tried to fax this trade and seil European goods to
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the long-distance traders. The only local product from the north sold to southern
Togo and to the neighbouring Gold Coast was livestock, because there the
demand for meat was rising as a result of rising incomes from export
production.
During the French colonial period (1914-1960) heavy taxation, forced labor and
forced production of groundnuts caused considerable labor migration from the
savannah region to the Gold Coast. Export production remained very limited
because the colonial administration skimmed off profits and the lack of
development of infrastructure hampered transportation to the coast. Livestock,
as food for the coastal Togolese and Gold Coast markets, remained therefore
an important commercial product. But in general the region was hardly
commercialized and market integration with other areas as well as internal
commoditization was very limited.
By the end of the French period an important shift took place in government
policy towards the north of Togo. Due to the rise of nationalism, more in
particular to the desire of the new political parties to win votes in this neglected
and economically unimportant part of the country, government programs starled
to pay more attention to the well-being of the inhabitants and to the negative
effects of colonial policy. In practice this meant the spread of health and
education facilities, modernization and commercialization of agricultural
production development of infrastructure and even a wavering start of soil
conservation activities and construction of small barrages in semi-permanent
streams.
After independence and two coups d'état in the 1960s (bringing northerners in
the political center of Togo) the north suddenly received a lot of
'developmentalist' government attention. Counterbalancing regional mequality
and a more equal spread of prosperity became important objectives. Reality
was less sunny, though. Industrialization remained almost completely
concentrated in the south and most Investments in the struggle agamst regional
inequality were directed to the Kara-region on the savannah region's southern
border However also the northern part of the savannah region has received its
share of development investments. 'Developmentalism' mainly came in the form
of integrated rural development programs, which were fmanced to a large
extend by foreign aid. Moreover, large-scale modernization of infrastructure has
integrated the northern region more closely with other parts of Togo.
From 1976 onwards the savannah region was planned to develop as the
supplier of food, mainly cereals, beans and livestock to the national market. But
although integrated rural development programs have managed to raise yield
per acre considerably, population has grown too and in the 1970s and 1980s
there have been dry periods and drops in erop production. In fact the result of
this is that, with livestock as an exception, the savannah region has become an
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importer of food in stead of an exporter (De Haan 1988, p. 173). On the other
hand because improvement of infrastructure did lower transportation costs to
the coast and because agricultural development programs were mostly focused
to export crops, enabling the peasants to pay off their inputs bought on credit,
export production has become more and more important. First the emphasis
was on groundnuts, later, from the 1970s until recently, the emphasis shifted to
cotton. In fact the savannah region is by now the most important cotton
producing area in Togo.
Infrastructure and agriculture have been the major development concerns for
the northerner-dominated Togolese government during the last decade. The
development of non-agricultural activities, education and health care, water
development and housing conditions did not get as much attention.
5.4 Government policy in Kenya's dry areas
Unlike the other four examples, dry areas in Kenya are pastoral areas to a
large extent. Before 1880 the pastoralists were the predominant force in Kenya,
both in the drylands and in more humid areas. Especially the Maasai were
controlling large portions of the territory. Dramatic droughts and diseases
between 1880 and 1900, followed by a British colonial policy favoring White
settler interests, resulted in a complete reversal of the fortunes of the
pastoralist societies. After Independence (1963), the government of Kenya also
gave priority to sedentary agriculture, especially in the humid areas of the
former 'White' highlands and in the areas of Kikuyu and related ethnic groups.
In most of dry Kenya the inhabitants had to cope with a harsh policy on top of a
harsh environment. We will describe the various phases of government
interference, using four historical 'breaking points': 1938, 1954, 1965 and 1976.
Early colonial policy was mainly concerned with 'pacification', Separation of
'tribes' and imposition of definite boundaries between them and their animals.
The whole of Northern Kenya became a closed zone, with restricted movement,
a Situation that would last until 1968. Existing marketing networks between
pastoralists and between cultivators and pastoral people were forced to
disappear. In the early part of the Century the pastoralists, the Maasai in
particular, lost an important part of their grazing area, both in the semiarid and
in the more humid areas. In the dry areas large-scale settler enterprises were
developed, livestock ranches and sisal estates. These enterprises
started to attract large numbers of labor migrants from the densely populated
humid areas. In the semiarid 'African Reserves' policies to attract labor
migrants were not very successful yet, despite taxation and - in the more
densely populated areas - direct labor recruitment. Although the British had
appointed African chiefs, their effective power to enforce alien laws was very
limited. Mostly the British did not bother too much about 'lawlessness' in the
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more remote dry areas. Now and then military and police actions were
organized against 'cattle thieves, tax defaulters, boundary trespassers and
other criminal elements'.
In the 1930s - and especially during the 1931-34 drought - environmental
degradation of the land was increasingly becoming an issue among government
employees dealing with the drylands. Baringo, Maasailand and the Akamba
area southeast of Nairobi were thought to become heavily overpopulated and
overstocked. The solution was called 'destocking'. In 1937 herdsmen were
forced to seil part of their stock to a newly established foreign meat canning
factory for very low prices. The 'Akamba Political Protest' following this
campaign was so widespread that the government was forced to use
persuasion in stead of violence. During the war cattle prices went up
dramatically, resulting in a clear marketing response from the cattle owners.
After the war, when prices slumped again, destocking could no longer be
contemplated as a major 'solution' and other methods of ecological
regeneration had to be found. Some grazing areas were closed to facilitate
natural recovery or reafforestation. Other areas were registered and enclosed,
hedges were planted against run-off and land was terraced along contours.
These were the domain of the African Land Development Board, established in
1946, also starting vaccination campaigns, water development and organized
stock marketing. In 1945 also a National Parks Ordinance created the legal
framework for a large number of parks and game reserves. The ecological
problem and destocking were not the only items on the agenda of the time. The
economie recovery after the Great Depression resulted in an increased demand
for wage labor. Before the war, labor migrants were predominantly coming from
ethnic groups in humid areas. During the war many men from the semiarid
areas were recruited for Army Service. During the Mau-Mau guerrilla (1950-56),
white employers regarded Kikuyu workers as too dangerous and began to
replace them by newcomers, among them many men from the relatively nearby
semiarid areas. Soon the Akamba areas Kitui and Machakos as well as Elgeyo-
Marakwet district were among the areas with the highest labor migrant
participation in Kenya.
The year 1954 is generally regarded as a major turning point in the colonial
attitude towards African agriculture in Kenya: from a settler-biased policy to
more attention for the 'African Reserves'. Now inadequate land-use methods
and traditional land tenure patterns became the most important fields of
interest. Pastoral land use was intensified through rotational grazing schemes
and through water development. 'Strang government', using grazing guards,
fines and imprisonment made the schemes very unpopulär. They came under
severe attack by African politicians at the eve of Independence. Grazing
scheme policy during the 1950s was coupled with an outspoken marketing
policy, using stock quota, stock routes, fencing, holding grounds and livestock
watering points. About the arable use of the semiarid lands the policy ideas
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were not all that clear during the late colonial period, despite the fact that an
increasing number of people were becoming agro-pastoralists. There was some
government attention for indigenous Irrigation and its commercial potential. Mau
prisoners were used to start minor Irrigation projects. Agro-pastoralists were
encouraged to grow 'famine crops' (cassava and sweet potatoes) and the first
results of plant breeding became available, drought-resistant ('Katumani') maize
varieties. Besides, the 1960-61 drought resulted in more attention for food crop
monitoring and in the first large-scale famine relief Operation.
After Independence, tribal and even International boundaries broke down äs
well äs regulations regarding stock quota and stock offtake. With an expanding
beef-consuming urban population, measures had to be taken to safeguard
commercial beef production. A specific Livestock Marketing Division was
organized within the Ministry of Agriculture. Ideas were formulated to organize a
stratified beef industry: arid areas would raise calves; afterthat ranches in the
semiarid areas would fatten the cattle; in the vicinity of the market, in more
humid surroundings, the fattening would be finished, producing heavy-weight,
high-quality animals. A lot of emphasis was put on the Maasai area. Here a
process started after Independence which was at that time regarded as rather
dangerous politically. Humid fringe areas were rapidly adjudicated äs individual
holdings, owned by non-Maasai. Quite a number of Maasai leaders also
succeeded to register large tracts of semiarid land as individual ranches. To
stop this process a 'group ranch' policy was thought to be more adequate.
Supported by the World Bank the 'Kenya Livestock Development Programme'
was launched to develop these group ranches. Crop cultivation, however, got
hardly any attention from government circles, although it was estimated that
only one quarter of the four million Kenyans living in the drylands were primarily
depending on livestock at that time. Most of these cultivators could be found in
Machakos and Kitui, where a process of semi-proletarianization was well under
way. A large minority of the households relied on remittances of male labor
migrants and on the (inadequate) production of food for home consumption by
the women and the children. A fast-growing population - in the 1970s 4 per
cent increase per year - increasingly endangered the quality of the land
available for cultivation. The breaking down of fallow requirements resulted in
productivity decreases and soil erosion. Land use competition between
pastoralism, cultivation, wildlife and wood production resulted in severe
conflicts. Droughts in 1971-73 and again in 1976 opened the eyes of many civil
servants about the fragility of living in these drylands.
After 1976 the relative neglect of the drylands in the government budget came
to a halt. Supported by FAO/UNDP and USAID projects were started in dry
areas, labelled 'integrated rural development', with a lot of emphasis in practice
on water development, education and health facilities. Dry-land food production
had to be increased by higher-yielding, drought-resistant varieties of maize,
sorghum and millet. A number of small-scale irrigation projects were started
II l
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with the aim to provide local food and employment opportunities (partly for
marginalized former pastoralists). A few large-scale Irrigation projects were
launched both for local food production and for cotton production (e.g. the Bura
Irrigation Project). The emphasis of production interventions clearly shifted from
livestock to arable farming. In Machakos an all-embracing 'Machakos Integrated
Development Programme' was starled in 1978, with EEG support. Soon it was
part of a nationwide 'Arid and Semi-Arid Lands Programme', covering almost all
dry districts, each district sub-program adopted by a particular donor. This
parcelling out of dry Kenya among foreign donors resulted in a patchwork of
approaches. ASAL Programmes mostly finance a large number of small,
scattered projects, to be implemented by the existing government machinery
and with a strong emphasis on 'populär participation'. Livestock only got
meagre attention. Most emphasis was put on agricultural development, water
development, soil conservation, education and training. The ASAL Programme
approach had a following wind in Kenya since the launching of the 'District
Focus for Rural Development', in 1983. Large numbers of additional civil
servants were posted to the rural districts from Nairobi and the District
Development Committees became important planning agencies. More or less
against this emphasis on district autonomy, a number of River Basm Authonties
were also created at the end of the 1970s. They had to initiate and co-ordmate
region-wide large-scale development activities, which were in many respects
the opposite of the ASAL and District Focus approach.
In the most recent Development Plan (1989-93) a change of attitude can be
noticed concerning livestock development after a decade of government
neglect Employment creation in the non-farm rural sector also gets much more
attention To enable a stronger integration of the various government policies
and to end the Situation of a donor-centered 'piece-meal treatment', a separate
Ministry of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands and Wastelands Development was
created in 1989. It remains to be seen whether in the era of structural
adjustment, privatization and cost recovery the 'developmentalist attitude'
towards the drylands will survive. Another possibility is that a multitude of non-
governmental organizations, already present in their hundreds, will take over a
lot of activities in the 'development domain' from the Kenyan government.
5.5 Government policy in Morocco's dry areas
Moroccan macro-economie and regional policy strongly tends to differentiate
between the central and fertile plains on the Atlantic Ocean, 'Maroc Utile', and
the dry and mountainous outer regions, 'Maroc Inutile'. However, at the
beginning of the French colonization (1912) the majority of the population lived
in these outer regions with limited agricultural potential. During the French
period mainly the economie potential of 'Maroc Utile' was developed. At first
especially rain-fed grain cultivation received attention and after that irrigated
agriculture and mining of phosphate. This resulted in large flows of internal
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migrants from the densely populated outer regions to the central plains,
changing dramatically the country's population distribution.
After independence (1956), the new government gave priority to the
development of infrastructure in order to integrale the Northern Rif area with
the rest of Morocco. The Rif had been colonized by Spain with an attitude
between neglect and repression. The Rif area was clearly among the poorest
regions of the country. Growing awareness of regional inequalities in the level
of living seemed to give rise to a change in policy. However, attempts in the
early 1960s to give more attention to education, health facilities and agricultural
reforms in the outer regions and to the development of rain-fed agriculture,
were brushed aside by a policy favoring industrial development in the cities and
large-scale irrigation projects, producing for the (European) export market in the
central region, e.g., World Bank-supported construction of about 30 barrages,
planned to irrigate one million hectares by the year 2,000. Between 1965 and
1977 approximately 80% of the agricultural Investments and more than 40% of
the total government Investments went to irrigation. With regard to the drier
regions with rain-fed agriculture, the government only wanted to guarantee a
minimum level of food and work, by means of large-scale supply of grain, relief
works and food-for-work projects. In order to maintain a continuous food supply,
both for the cities and the drier regions, grain was imported from Canada, the
U.S.A. and France in large quantities.
In the mid-1970s the Moroccan government had to break with its policy of
agricultural neglect of the outer areas. A crisis was caused by deteriorating
terms of trade, negative balances of payment, loss of part of the Western
European market to new members of the European Community like Spain,
Portugal and Greece and political unrest in the cities, which were füll of
unemployed migrants, who had left the neglected rural areas. Two Army coups
that failed also played their part. Rural areas instead of cities, and rain-fed
agriculture instead of irrigated agriculture received priority in the new
development plans from 1978 onwards. Above all, the Moroccan government
wanted to stop rural-urban migration by improving living conditions in the rural
areas. That is why education, health care, electricity, drinking water and '
housing facilities are being improved. Secondly in those dry regions with
relatively favorable climatic conditions for rain-fed agriculture (annual rainfall
between 400 and 800 mms), wheat and barley production is stimulated in large
integrated rural development projects. These projects aim at the development
of infrastructure and basic facilities for the rural population, besides increased
grain - and currently also meat - production for the national market. The new
policy seems to be successful if one looks at the current population increase of
rural centers and towns, which exceeds the average population growth in
Morocco's large cities.
65
5.6 Government policy in Mexico's dry areas
Mexico's dry regions differ widely in population densities, ethnicity, urbanization
and level of economie development. The approach of the Mexican government
can be characterized as mainly a sectoral policy, an agricultural policy in
particular. One can even speak of an 'agricultural bias' in Mexican rural
development programs, completely overlooking the non-agricultural productive
sector (Druijven, 1990) and the peasantry as a mass of consumers. National,
macro-level government policy has a major influence on these sectoral policies.
Between the variety of sectoral policies and sub-policies hardly any co-
ordination exists and little continuity. A Strang tendency to identify new
initiatives with the President means that after every 'sexenio' (six-year
presidential periods) everything changes and on-going projects are never
concluded (a tendency known äs 'proyectismo'). Macro-level policy in Mexico
can be described by using the following periodization.
In the first two or three decades after the Mexican Revolution (1910) the
redistribution of landed property was the most important item on the new
government's agenda. However, the land reform failed to result in a drastic
increase of agricultural production, which was regarded as a must to feed the
fast-growing population and to support an (import-substitution-) industrial
breakthrough. In the Central Highlands of Mexico in particular an extremely fast
urbanization process and agricultural Stagnation were each other's partners.
During the late 1940s the Mexican government, inspired by the success of the
US Tennessee Valley Authority, tried to develop the coastal areas. Quite a
number of river basins ('cuencas hidrologicas') were seen as natural
development regions. Large-scale and expensive projects to make dams, dikes
and artificial lakes resulted in a sharp increase in irrigated land and in large-
scale production of electricity. Part of the development goal was to settle
people from the densely-populated Central Highlands in these Coastal river
basin areas. But despite the colonization of these areas it did not result in a
major population redistribution, large enough to bring down the population in
and around Mexico city. From a planning point of view, the river basin as a
basis for development policy were soon regarded as a failure, because of the
often extreme interna! differentiation.
Considerable government Investment in irrigation development in the dry north-
western and northern parts of Mexico became the major element of agricultural
policy. Between 1940 and 1968 between 80 and 90 per cent of the total
agricultural budget was spent on irrigation. The Mexican government wanted
these irrigated areas in the north to become the input producers for agro-
industry and the suppliers of foreign exchange to finance the import of industrial
capital goods. Land owners in the north became wealthy farmers, partly based
on government subsidies. The peasantry and the co-operative cultivators (the
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'ejidatarios') of the Central Highlands, however, were hardly supported to
increase their irrigated area. They remained the suppliers of cheap food for the
urban population. The Green Revolution of the early 1960s further accentuated
the dichotomy. The hybrid maize varieties had to be accompanied by other
inputs. Only a minority of the cultivators, and mainly those in the North, were
able to gain from the new technological developments.
After 1965 Mexico was confronted with an agricultural crisis with two sides. On
the one hand an increasing volume of basic food like maize, vegetables,
oilseeds and dairy products had to be imported. On the other hand the
peasantry was impoverished by the very low prices for their agricultural
products. Growth of agricultural production clearly lagged behind the population
growth and the impoverished conditions in the rural areas created a fiood of
migrants towards the cities, further increasing the food demand. In the national
agricultural policy the peasantry was greatly overlooked.
In 1967 the integrated rural development program 'Puebla' was starled. This
program tried to show that an appropriate application of the agrarian technology
of the Green Revolution could diminish the problem of rural poverty and
stimulate the commercial production by the peasantry. Cultivators which had
been neglected up till then could gain access to credit and fertilizers, if they had
enough irrigated land. But not all areas had Irrigation possibilities and not all
cultivators in irrigated regions had access to irrigated plots.
When it became clear that many peasants in the rain-fed areas of the drylands
could no longer cultivate their land or refused to continue, and the agricultural
crisis was far from solved, the government starled to become involved in
development policy in those rain-fed areas. During Ihe 1970s and early 1980s
the dry areas were suddenly confronted wilh many rural development
programs, some far beyond agricullure alone. Mexico's oil boom resulted in an
expanding government budget and in a government attitude towards the
impoverished areas which moved from neglect to a 'welfare ideology'.
From 1973 until Ihe mid-1980s 'PIDER' was a large-scale program of
'integraled rural developmenl' in 140 'micro-regions', which were mainly located
in the semiarid areas. Supported by the World Bank the program put an
emphasis on productive Investments. Each micro region was meant to be a
planning unit for projects in agriculture, infrastructure, health care and
education. Originally the program was centrally planned, with the involvement of
fourteen federal government institutions. In 1981 the program was decentralized
to the level of the states.
Between 1977 and 1980 the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (SARH) had
its own 'rain-dependent districts' program. Technological innovations had-to be
geared to the needs and possibilities of peasants in rain-fed areas. During the
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same period a specific program was directed at regions that were regarded as
being most marginal, often very isolated and with a meagre development
potential. The major objective of this 'Coplamar' Programme was to improve the
education, health and other cultural facilities in those areas, which happened to
be the Indian areas ('Indigenas').
During the 'second oil boom' (1980-1982) an ambitious policy was launched to
realize a total national seif sufficiency of basic food (the 'SAM' program). Using
a system of subsidies the production, distribution and consumption of basic
food had to be changed considerably.
The year 1982 can be regarded as a major turning point after a decade of
unprecedented attention for the poor dry areas. Despite the oil boom income,
the government budget had rocketed beyond the means in such a way that the
enormous foreign debt created a financial crisis in 1982. During the presidency
of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) the debt problem and lack of political
support lead to a breakdown of all government-inspired rural development
initiatives in the dry areas. The 'PRONADRI' plan in the 1983-88 National
Development Plan, with explicit attention for the dry lands, was never
implemented.
5.7 Government policy in Spain's dry areas
Over the years, the Spanish government has intervened in the country's dry
areas in numerous different ways. This variety results from the fact that Spain's
dry regions differ notably from one another in terms of their socio-economic,
demographic and physiographic characteristics. Interventions in the semiarid
Madrid region obviously deviate from those in such partially depopulated and
erosion-scarred mountainous areas as the Sierra Morena and the Montes
Orientales. And in the dry coastal plains of Alicante and Murcia, they are
different again. Below, attention is focused on the types of interventions found
mainly in the comparatively backward rural areas with a dry ciimate.
Broadly speaking, the objectives pursued by the central government in dry rural
areas may be divided into five groups: 1) promotion of Irrigation, 2) Provision of
drinking water, 3) erosion and flood control, 4) enhancement of agricultural
productivity and 5) socio-economic development.
Government efforts to develop irrigation have a long history in Spain, daling
back to ancient (Roman and Moorish) times. During the first half of the Franco
period (1939-1975), large irrigation projects served to reduce rural
unemployment and poverty (the 'hydraulic policy'). By means of land settlement
schemes, areas previously not used for cultivation were brought into production
in order to enable landless agricultural laborers to have their own farms. Thus,
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a class of small private farmers came into being, next to the large landowners
who dominated the Spanish countryside for a long time. In this period of
'autarkia' the fascist ideology favored small farmers as a social class. Landless
laborers were regarded as politically dangerous. Their dissolution into a
peasantry was thought to be a remedy against socialist and anarchist uprisings.
During the 1960s, however, Franco's irrigation-cum-settlement policy changed.
It was aimed less at raising the number of small farmers than it was to increase
overall agricultural productivity and efficiency. Part of Spain's newly irrigated
land in the semiarid zone became the hub of export-directed production of fruits
and vegetables. This trend was continued during the 1970s and 1980s, with
government policies emphasising modernization and mechanization, now also
including the upgrading of old Irrigation Systems. The latter involved replacing
simple hand-dug ditches by concrete channels and conduits, and installing
pipes and drip-irrigation Systems. In latifundismo-dominated regions like
Andalusia, such infrastructural improvements served the additional purpose of
reducing the high rate of unemployment among the many landless day
laborers.
Not long ago, countless villages in the drier parts of Spain had little or no
drinking water for part of the year. Since the 1960s, when the government
decided that every community ought to have an adequate supply of water
throughout the year, much has been done to alleviate this problem, and today
virtually every village has its piped water System. Even so, du ring a period of
excessive drought, the local wells (and river-fed reservoirs) may fall dry, leaving
the villages without any water. When that happens, the government mobilizes a
fleet of water trucks for shipping water into the stricken areas.
Following centuries of deforestation and overgrazing, soil erosion has become a
serious problem in much of semiarid Spain. In addition to the widespread loss
of farmland, artificial lakes become filled with sediments while irrigation
channels become clogged up. As a result of increased surf ace run-off and
chocked river channels, sudden down-pours tend to cause destructive floods
(riadas). By means of reforestation projects and the construction of dams and
terraces, the government has made impressive efforts to control soil erosion
and to protect the villages and irrigated land - both usually located in the river
valleys - against the violent and dangerous riadas.
Besides being concerned about problems caused either by too little or too
much water, the government is active in disseminating information about
improved methods of producing crops and livestock. At present Spain has an
extensive network of agricultural extension centers, the extensión agraria. This
service includes research stations where, among others, experiments are
carried out aimed at developing and/or improving drought-resistant erop
varieties and animal breeds.
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Finally, government interventions involve a host of activities which in one way
or another contribute to raising the quality of life in the rural communities in the
drylands. In areas suffering from 'overpopulation', people are encouraged and
assisted to become permanent outmigrants. Over the years, courses have been
offered to villagers interested in finding (seasonal) employment in tourist
centers or cities. Apart from building piped water Systems, other infrastructural
improvements have been made, such as numerous roads and bridges, health
care facilities and schools. But perhaps most spectacular have been the welfare
benefits made available by the government since 1977. A combination of old-
age pensions, public works schemes (to relieve unemployment), disability
payments and other forms of social security - all financed by 'Madrid' - has
contributed substantially to raising the level of material well-being of the millions
of landless people and small farmers trying to make a living in Spain's poorly
endowed, dry regions.
5.8 Shifts in government policy emphasis
In chapter 5.1 we have differentiated between eight major approaches of
governments towards dry areas. Here we will schematically summarize our
findings for the five countries.
Table 5.1 clearly shows that there is a general shift in emphasis from neglect,
repression and expropriation until the mid-1950s to infrastructural Investments
and support for agricultural productivity since the mid 1950s with an additional
emphasis on relief/basic needs/welfare and the environment since the 1970s.
Government neglect of dry areas is the dominant attitude for Togo, Kenya and
northern Morocco for most of the early part of the Century; for the Moroccan Rif
area even going on until Independence, now and again interrupted by military
actions. Occasional shows of force are also evident for Kenya, even until today.
Repression was a dominant feature for Spain during and after the civil war.
Expropriation of produce from the dry areas through government interference
was mainly experienced by northern Togo at the end of the German period and
occasionally during the French period. More indirect forms of government
expropriation could be found in semiarid Spain before the 1930s. Governments
regarded dry areas as domains for labor recruitment in all five countries, but in
different periods: in Togo all through the French period, in Kenya mainly
starting after the 1930s but dying out after Independence (this does not mean
that labor migration was no longer relevant, only that active government support
came to an end), in northern Morocco, Mexico and Spain mainly starting after
1960.
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Table 5.1 Government policy in dry areas: a summary
Emphasis Period
1910 1925 1940 1955 1970 1985
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k, K : Kenya; m, M: northern Morocco (Rif, the former Spanish part); s, S: Spain; t, T
Togo; x, X: Mexico (capital letters: major government emphasis).
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Active government support for infrastructural development in dry areas starled
in Spain and Mexico after 1940, both directed at improved physical
infrastructure and improved educational and health facilities. In northern
Morocco the area was rapidly opened up after 1960. In Togo and Kenya the
Investments were much smaller and starled later. In Kenya government-
directed improvements in education were impressive after 1975, often logether
with a strong increase in activities of non-governmental organisations,
supported by a variety of foreign donors, which seems to be far less important
in the other countries. Other changes in the conditions for production and
distribution are meagre: land reform was a key issue in Mexico in the first two
decades after the 1910 revolution; and in Spain, in an aborted form, around
1935. Government interference in land issues were important during some
periods in Kenya.
A growing government activity in altempls to increase the agricultural
productivity of dry lands (mainly for some cash crops, but increasingly for some
food crops too) are evident for all areas since the late 1950s, preceded by
earlier attempts in Mexico and Spain. Government support for the development
of mining enterprises has been important in Morocco and Mexico. Genuine
attempts at government support for or even government initiatives directed at
industrial development of some of the dry areas can be found in (northern)
Mexico and in some of the Central areas of Spain, but hardly in the other three
countries.
Government attention for relief and basic needs as an issue grows in all
countries since the early 1970s, changing to a form of government-based social
security in Mexico during the 'oil boom' and in Spain after the late 1970s.
The 'environment' as an issue for government Intervention is high on the
current agenda in most countries, but it is interesting to note that there have
been occasional periods in which there was a lot of government concern for
environmental degradation in dry lands before.
Government attention for dry areas does not necessarily mean government
activities in all dry areas. The above-given description only gives a comparative
context. In the second part of the book five specific case studies are being
presented, each of which should be read within the overall framework of this
contextual evidence.
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